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SUMMARY:
... THE MOST RECENT ATTACK ON THE CORPORATE TAX ... Furthermore, because of the small business
credit, the system of refundable taxes for investment income earned by private corporations, and the dividend tax credit
mechanism, business income earned by Canadian--controlled private corporations and investment income earned by
private corporations is not subject to any form of double tax in the Canadian tax system. ... If the corporate tax is lower
than the individual tax, as it has been throughout most of the history of the income tax, and if corporations retain part
of their earnings, and if capital gains are taxed at preferential tax rates, under a set of reasonable assumptions, the tax
system ---- even with the separate corporate tax ---- can be shown to favour equity over debt. The deferral advantage offered
by the corporation for the individual shareholder, which arises because the yield on the income retained in the corporation
will initially only be taxed at the lower corporate tax rate, and the lower rate of tax on capital gains that the individual
shareholder will pay on disposition, will more than offset the tax advantage to an individual bondholder of not paying the
corporate tax on interest distributions. ...
TEXT:
[*621] I. THE MOST RECENT ATTACK ON THE CORPORATE TAX
A proposal to eliminate the personal income tax on dividends was the major element in American President George W.
Bush's budget plan, dubbed his "growth package", announced at the beginning of 2003. n1 This aspect of his budget
plan, which accounted for over one--half of the value of the tax cuts proposed in the plan, came as something of a surprise
to most political observers since it had not been part of the President's campaign platform in 2000 nor had it been the
subject of a recent study by the U.S. Treasury Department. n2 Although, after much debate, Congress has decided to
maintain [*622] taxes on dividends, but at a reduced rate, it seems likely that renewed attacks on dividend taxation will
be forthcoming. n3
Following President Bush's lead, a number of Canadian financial commentators immediately called for the full
removal of the tax on dividends in Canada. n4 Jack Mintz, president and CEO of the C.D. Howe Institute and a professor
of taxation at the J.L. Rotman School of Management at the University of Toronto, anticipated the U.S. proposals and
urged the Canadian government to follow the U.S. lead on the same day that President Bush announced his budget plan.
n5 In his article in the National Post, Mintz gave five reasons for eliminating the double tax on corporate income in
Canada: it would reduce the cost of capital, eliminate the preference for capital gains over dividends, eliminate the tax
disincentive for corporations to pay dividends, remove the incentive for investors to arbitrage between corporate and other
investment vehicles, and provide a tax break to middle--income Canadians. Jason Clemens, Director of Fiscal Studies at
the Fraser Institute, echoed Mintz' call for a reduction in dividend taxes, citing the rationales given by President Bush ---the tax cuts would spur investment, improve capital market efficiency, lower the cost of capital, and improve corporate

Page 2
36 U.B.C. L. Rev. 621, *623

[*623] responsibility. n6 Vern Krishna, tax counsel with Borden Ladner Gervais LLP and executive director of the
CGA Tax Research Centre at the University of Ottawa, in a column in The Globe and Mail, called the double taxation of
corporate income "anathema to the notion of fairness." n7 Krishna further justified his appeal for Canada to follow the
U.S. lead by noting that removing the double taxation of dividend income would lower the overall cost of capital, remove
distortions in investor decisions, and increase the market capitalization of dividend--paying stocks.
These immediate and insistent calls by Canadian commentators to follow the American lead were as surprising as
President Bush's initial attack on the separate corporate tax. The United States has a classical corporate tax system.
Corporations pay tax on their profits and shareholders pay full tax on the dividends they receive. By contrast, Canada
has for many years partially integrated its corporation and shareholder taxes. n8 Canadian corporations pay tax on their
profits, but when corporations distribute dividends to shareholders resident in Canada, those shareholders receive an
offset against their tax liability equal to about 20 percentage points of corporate tax. The amount of this tax credit offsets
roughly the statutory rate of tax paid by small businesses, and offsets about half the statutory rate of tax paid by large
corporations. The difference between the Canadian system and President [*624] Bush's proposal is, in some ways, one
of degree. Stated generally, President Bush's proposal would have exempted all recipients of dividends from tax provided
those dividends were paid from taxed corporate income, while Canada's integration system provides a tax credit that
amounts to only partial integration of the corporate tax, whether or not that tax was actually been paid. The most recent
study of the Canadian corporate tax system was undertaken by the Technical Committee on Business Taxation (the Mintz
Committee, named after its chair Jack Mintz), which was appointed in 1996 to review taxes paid by Canadian business
and recommend ways of improving the business tax system. The Mintz Committee was asked to focus on the objectives of
promoting job creation and economic growth, simplifying business taxation, and enhancing the fairness of the tax system
to ensure that all businesses supported the costs of government services. Ultimately the Mintz Committee concluded there
was no need to reform the relationship between Canada's corporate and personal tax systems since "the integration of
corporate and personal income tax can only be partial, if a proper balance of [the] conflicting functions for the corporate
tax is to be achieved." n9 Although most of his arguments in the National Post in support of greater integration in Canada
would appear to have been as relevant in 1998, the year the Mintz Committee report was published, as they might be
today, presumably Jack Mintz changed his mind about the value of integration in Canada between the publication of the
report and the publication of his article in 2003. n10
A separate corporate tax might seem anomalous to corporate law lawyers. Although natural entity theories of the
corporation may have been popular in [*625] the late--19th and early--20th Centuries, n11 arguably making a separate
corporate tax seem more defensible, modern financial theory and recent theoretical advancements in corporate law have
been premised on the assumption that all forms of legal enterprise are simply a nexus of contracts among individuals
such as shareholders, creditors, suppliers and employees. n12 This paper argues that it is not necessary to subscribe
to a belief that the corporation is an entity separate from these contracting individuals to recognize that the separate
corporate tax plays a number of important, necessary, and irreplaceable roles in a modern tax system. Many scholars have
reviewed the arguments for and against the corporate tax and little conceptual clarity can be added to those arguments;
n13 nevertheless, in light of the current interest in removing the double tax on corporate--source income, it seems an
appropriate occasion to reexamine them. Instead of dealing narrowly with President Bush's dividend exclusion model, this
paper will deal more broadly with the issues relating to the separate corporate and shareholder level taxes. It is suggested
that the cumulative force of the arguments in favour of maintaining the separate corporate tax is often understated; the
costs and disadvantages of the tax are often exaggerated.
Attacks on the corporate tax are not new. Although it might be difficult to generalize about the precipitating events, such
attacks have recurred at fairly regular intervals over the history of the corporate tax. The objections that businesspeople
might have to the tax are obvious, but economists, who agree on little else, also have been almost unanimous in opposing
the tax. Henry Simons, the founder of modern tax policy analysis, abhorred corporate taxes in any form. n14 Richard Bird,
one of Canada's most prolific tax scholars, has observed that "one important policy question on which most economists
appear to agree ... is that there is very little to be said in favour of taxing [*626] corporations". n15 Tax law scholars have
also generally opposed the separate corporate tax and have suggested that it should be replaced with a form of tax that
integrates the corporate and shareholder level taxes. n16 Over the past 40 years, government reports in several countries
have also recommended integrating the corporate and shareholder level taxes. n17 During the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, many
countries, including France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Australia adopted some form of integration. n18
[*627] In recent years some commentators have become more sceptical of the advantages of integration and a few
countries have moved away from their partially integrated corporate tax systems. n19 This apparent rethinking of the role
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of the separate corporate tax perhaps is reflected in the report of the Mintz Committee, which did not recommend any
further integration of the corporate tax in Canada. Certainly, in recent years, perhaps due to the spectacular performance
of the United States economy during most of the 1990s, there has been little suggestion of the need to reform the United
States' classical corporate tax system. Only four years ago a law professor at the University of Chicago, David Weisbach,
made the following prediction:
The two--tier corporate tax has been part of our income tax system since its founding. It taxes income from
investment in corporate stock at a higher rate than income from other investments (in either corporations,
through a different financial instrument, or in non--corporate businesses). Although academics, and more
recently the Treasury Department, have long called for elimination of the two--tier tax system, there has never
been a strong political push in the United States to reform it. The two--tier corporate tax will likely be with us
for the indefinite future. n20
The fact that President Bush's dividend exemption proposal was supported with little analysis or evidence of its need
or impact has led a number of critics to suggest that Bush's tax proposal was simply a way of giving a large tax break
to the rich. Nobel prize winners Franco Modigliani and Robert Solow stated unequivocally "the real intent [of the 15
percent dividend tax rate plan] is a continuation of the old struggle to enrich the wealthy at the expense of ordinary
people, including future generations." n21 This explanation for the proposed dividend exemption has been coupled with
an expressed concern [*628] about its adverse economic and tax system effects. n22 Somewhat typical of the critical
responses is that of Reuven Avi--Yonah and David Miller, a tax scholar and a tax practitioner respectively, in an article in
the Washington Post. They argue that the dividend exclusion will not stimulate the economy, will add undue complexity
to the tax system, is unlikely to address the preference for debt, may draw investors to more risky investments creating
greater recession in the next stock downturn, will make it more difficult for states and cities to raise money by issuing
tax--exempt municipal bonds, might be difficult to justify to residents of U.S. treaty partners, and will primarily benefit
the wealthy. n23
One of the justifications for the American dividend exclusion proposal of special interest to corporate lawyers is the
explicit link the administration made between the proposed tax change and corporate governance reform. Removing the
tax on dividends, the administration argued in presenting the proposal, would improve corporate governance in two ways.
First, it would encourage corporations to pay out more of their retained earnings as dividends hence removing large
pools of capital from the hands of corporate managers. As a result agency costs for shareholders would be reduced and
dividends would once again be able to perform their essential function of signalling to shareholders how efficiently the
corporation is being operated. Second, removing the shareholder tax on dividends would remove the current incentive for
corporations to borrow instead of issuing new stock to finance their operations. Thus, the leverage of companies would be
reduced and the [*629] economy would be less fragile. n24 Vice President Cheney reiterated these rationales in stating
that the proposal would:
... transform corporate behavior in America and encourage responsible practices. Without the current tax
penalty, investors will demand higher cash dividends and companies will be motivated to share them. This
should discourage companies from artificially inflating profits just to cause a temporary spike in stock prices.
n25
The rest of this paper is divided into two parts followed by a conclusion. Part II reviews a number of objectives
of the corporate tax, arguing that they should carry more weight as arguments in favour of the corporate tax than they
are often attributed. Furthermore, while it is conceded that the corporate tax is a second or even an nth best tax for
achieving these objectives, there are simply no administratively feasible or politically acceptable alternatives to it. The
arguments reviewed in the paper are as follows. First, by taxing income from capital, the corporate tax increases the
comprehensiveness, progressivity, and fairness of the income tax. Second, since it falls, at least in part, on pure economic
profits, the corporate tax, at least to this extent, raises revenue efficiently. Third, the corporate tax is a necessary support
for the individual income tax since without it corporate--source income could accumulate tax--free. Of course, this familiar
withholding function of the corporate tax would suggest that the corporate tax should then be refunded when corporate
retained earnings are distributed and taxed in the hands of individual shareholders; however, the additional economic
inefficiencies and administrative complexities created by all apparently politically acceptable systems of refunding the
corporate tax make the effort not worth the costs. Fourth, the corporate tax is a justifiable, widely accepted and efficient
method for source countries to levy tax on the business income earned by non--residents. Fifth, the tax serves as a benefit
tax, requiring corporations to bear part of the cost of the government services from which their business operations clearly
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benefit. Sixth, the tax serves the pragmatic purpose of collecting a good deal of revenue in an administratively efficient and
politically acceptable way. Seventh, since the corporate tax is in place, and the economy has adjusted to it, any changes in
the tax will cause inequities and windfall gains.
Economists and other critics have a long litany of complaints about the corporate tax. These arguments can be
grouped under the traditional tax policy [*630] criteria of equity, efficiency, and administrative practicality. Part III of
the paper argues that these arguments against the corporate tax are not as compelling as they might appear. The arguments
addressed in this part of the paper are as follows. First, critics argue that the corporate tax amounts to double tax and
therefore is inequitable. Second, they argue that the tax creates three types of distortions: distortions in corporate payout
policies in favour of the retention of corporate earnings as compared with its distributions; distortions in the debt/equity
ratios in favour of debt and against new share issues; and distortions in the legal forms of business organization in favour
of non--corporate as compared with corporate forms. Third, they argue that the corporate tax is difficult to administer
because it requires inherently arbitrary line drawing between legal concepts such as corporate and non--corporate business
enterprises, and debt and equity.
The conclusion reviews and dismisses the arguments made in favour of adopting the American proposal to exempt
dividends from taxation, or some variation of that proposal. Also, it presents an optimistic prediction about the future role
of the corporate tax. Some critics of the separate corporate tax have maintained that even if policy makers do not abandon
the tax because they are not persuaded by the tax policy arguments in favour of its abolition, increasing globalization
will force its demise. Instead of this pessimistic diagnosis of the future role of the corporate tax, the paper concludes by
suggesting that the same factors that are relied upon to predict its ultimate rejection may in fact be the factors that dictate
the survival of the corporate tax.
II. THE CASE FOR THE CORPORATE TAX
A. THE CORPORATE TAX INCREASES THE COMPREHENSIVENESS, PROGRESSIVITY AND FAIRNESS OF
THE TAX SYSTEM
The corporate tax is often justified by laypersons on the grounds that large corporations earn vast sums of income and,
therefore, have ample ability to pay. But, although corporations clearly have ability to pay in the ordinary sense of that
phrase, they do not have any ability to pay as that phrase is understood in the context of tax policy analysis. The phrase
"ability to pay" in the tax policy context can only refer to the income of individuals. Income for tax purposes is defined
broadly as the sum of the value of the goods and services that individuals personally consume in a year and the change in
their net wealth. n26 Corporations, being legal constructs, cannot engage in personal consumption nor, since all of their
wealth belongs to their individual security [*631] holders, does it make any sense to attach significance to changes in
their net wealth. Early tax policy analysts might have supported this justification for the corporate tax, n27 but none do
now. n28
However, simply because a corporation itself does not have any ability to pay, does not mean a normative justification
for the corporate tax on the grounds of fairness does not exist. In a comprehensive income tax, all forms of income ---including income from capital and income from labour ---- would be subject to the same level of tax. n29 Income from
labour is generally taxed relatively comprehensively under the income tax; however, it is notoriously difficult to subject
all forms of income from capital to income tax. n30 Many forms of income from capital escape the income tax entirely,
others receive favourable income tax treatment: if income from capital accrues in the form of capital gains, it is not
recognized until the gain is realized and then it is subject to tax only at very favourable tax rates; income from capital
earned in RRSPs, life insurance policies, and other tax--exempt investment vehicles is exempt entirely from tax; income
from capital earned in the form of annuity payments is subject to favourable tax treatment; the tax on income from capital
is often deferred through the use of excess interest deductions and other tax sheltering strategies; capital income earned
through the ownership of homes, whether in the form of imputed rent or capital appreciation, is completely exempt from
tax; and even fully taxable income from capital often escapes tax as a result of tax evasion. Studies have consistently
shown that the overall rate of tax on income from capital is very low, if not negative. For example, because of the tax
savings that can be realized by the ability to postpone realization of capital gains, it has been estimated that the so--called
accrual equivalent rate of capital [*632] gains tax in Canada is anywhere from zero to 10 percent. n31 Indeed it is so
well known that income from capital is taxed lightly under the income tax that the tax itself has been referred to as a
hybrid tax -- part income tax and part consumption tax. n32 In fact, in part because of the apparent difficulties of taxing
income from capital comprehensively, many tax analysts have suggested that the income tax system should be converted
to a tax on consumption alone. n33 Nevertheless, as long as we have an income tax, it would seem important that income
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be taxed as comprehensively as possible. Therefore, because of the difficulties of taxing income from capital in other
ways, an important role of the corporate income tax is to impose some level of tax on income from capital, even if the
corporate tax is an admittedly crude device.
This argument for the corporate tax, that it increases comprehensiveness, assumes that the tax falls on income from
capital. In other words, it assumes that the corporate tax reduces the income earned by shareholders. Yet the incidence
of the corporate tax, which is the empirical question of whose share of national income is reduced by the corporate tax,
remains one of the most contentious issues in tax policy analysis. n34 In theory, the tax might reduce the income of
individuals in their roles as consumers, workers, or owners of capital. For example, corporate managers might be able to
treat the cost of the corporate income tax like any other cost and pass it on to consumers in the form of higher prices.
The tax might reduce the amount of capital employed in the economy and thus reduce the productivity and real wages of
workers. [*633] Alternatively, the tax might fall on workers more directly, through negotiated wage settlements, simply
because they are the least mobile factor of production in the economy.
The economic incidence of the corporate tax undoubtedly depends upon a wide range of factors and likely varies from
industry to industry and even firm to firm. n35 However, the traditional view is that the tax falls on individuals in their
role as owners of capital. In the short term, it likely falls directly on corporate profits and thus reduces the rate of return
of individuals owning corporate equity capital. In the longer term, however, it is likely shifted to all owners of capital as
owners of corporate equity shift their capital to other forms of investments in response to the reduced rate of return they
earn on their shares. The increase in demand for these non--corporate equity investments reduces their rates of return, and
the reduced demand for corporate equity results in the bidding up of its rate of return. This movement of capital continues
until the after--tax rate of return on corporate equity equals the rate of return of other investments of the same risk. Thus,
the rate of return for all capital falls, and the corporate tax is effectively borne by all owners of capital. n36 Naturally, the
precise effect of the corporate tax is infinitely more complicated than this simple story suggests, and every step in the
real story of the incidence of the tax is contested. Although both the theory and the empirical evidence relating to the
incidence of the corporate tax is still the subject of great debate and uncertainty, the prevailing view remains that at least a
good portion of the tax falls on income from capital. n37
[*634] If those earning income from capital bear the corporate tax then, not only does the tax increase the
comprehensiveness of the income tax, but also it greatly increases its progressivity. n38 As an indication of the prevailing
view of the incidence of the corporate tax, and of its progressive effect, applied incidence studies ---- studies applying
theories of tax incidence to estimate the effect of the Canadian tax system on the distribution of income -- invariably find
that the corporate tax increases the redistributive effect of the tax system. In the most frequently relied upon Canadian
study on tax incidence, the authors, Frank Vermaeten, Irwin Gillespie, and Arndt Vermaeten, n39 assume that to the
extent that the Canadian corporate tax rate is equal to the common world rate, which they assume is the U.S. rate, it is
borne by owners of corporate shares. To the extent that Canadian corporate tax rates exceed the U.S. rate, they assume
it is borne by immobile factors of production, such as workers, or passed forward to consumers. Since they find that the
effective corporate tax rate in Canada is about equal to the U.S. rate, they assume (in their standard case) that the entire
corporate tax is borne by owners of capital income. On this assumption, the corporate tax is by far the most progressive
tax in the Canadian tax system since largely high--income individuals realize capital income. They find that Canadian
families earning up to $150,000 pay a trivial amount of their income in corporate taxes: less than 1.3 percent. However,
the effective tax rate increases sharply for higher income individuals and the richest 1 percent of families is found to pay
about 12 [*635] percent of family income in corporate taxes. n40 Without the corporate tax, the incidence of the tax
system would be regressive over the highest income ranges.
In another applied incidence study, Ruggeri, Van Wart, and Howard assume in their standard case that half the
corporate tax is borne by owners of capital and half is shifted forward to consumers. n41 Even on this much less
progressive assumption about the corporate tax, they find that while the tax is mildly regressive over the low end of the
income scale it becomes mildly progressive over higher income ranges and sharply progressive for the highest income
earners. n42 The Fraser Institute, a Canadian economic think--tank, in its periodic assessment of the incidence of the
Canadian tax system also assumes that the corporate tax is borne by owners of capital. n43 On this assumption they find
that over 62 percent of the corporate tax is paid by people in the upper 3 deciles of the income distribution. n44
There is little question that any assumption about the incidence of the corporate tax affects an analysis of the fairness
of the tax. If the tax is passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices, like all sales taxes, it would be regressive,
or proportional at best; if it results in lower wages for workers in the long run it is odd that it would be a tax that is
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normally championed by labour unions; if it is borne by corporate shareholders, or all owners of capital, it is steeply
progressive. Sound theoretical reasons and empirical studies can be mustered to support each of these positions. Some
have suggested that one reason that the tax is so politically popular is that no one knows for sure who pays it. Uncertainties
over the incidence of the corporate tax led the Mintz Committee to conclude that it should not be used or supported as a
redistributive tax. n45
[*636] Faced with these uncertainties, the question is what assumption about the incidence of the tax should be made
to guide policymaking? An obvious answer is to adopt the prevailing view. Furthermore, it is difficult to reconcile the
views of some economists on the question of who bears the tax with their stance on the economic inefficiencies caused
by the tax. If, for example, the tax is shifted forward to consumers in the form of higher prices or backward directly to
workers in the form of lower wages, and does not therefore reduce the return to equity capital, presumably it would have
few of the distortionary effects that economists attribute to it and that motivate them to want it repealed. Moreover, one
might observe that most businesspeople and business lobbyists seem to feel that they and their clients pay the corporate
tax. While there is no reason for believing that these people have any special expertise in judging the incidence of taxes
generally, perhaps they have some tacit knowledge relating to the corporate tax based on their experience with the markets
that the tax affects. In any event, they appear to be prepared to devote considerable resources to attempting to have the tax
reduced.
B. BY TAXING PURE ECONOMIC PROFITS THE CORPORATE TAX RAISES REVENUE EFFICIENTLY
A second justification for the corporate tax is that it operates (admittedly somewhat crudely) as a tax on pure economic
profits (or economic rents or pure profits or excess profits, as this type of profit is variously called). Pure economic profits
are the earnings of a firm above the earnings the firm requires to fund all of its costs, including the costs of labour and
materials, the costs of depreciation and inventory usage, and the full cost of financing the firm's operations (the real interest
cost in the case of debt financing and the imputed or opportunity cost in the case of equity financing). The normative
justification for imposing a tax on pure economic profits is that such a tax is neutral. Since pure economic profits are by
definition the earnings that exceed the opportunity cost of a corporation's investment, corporations will have no incentive
to change their investment behaviour if these profits are taxed at any rate less than 100 percent. There is likely a good deal
of pure economic profit earned in the Canadian economy, n46 most of it by corporations. Opportunities [*637] to earn
pure economic profits arise whenever a firm has a degree of monopoly power in a market, is exploiting natural resources,
is operating in a regulated industry, or has some unique location or other business advantage.
The base of the current corporate tax might be described as normal economic profit not pure economic profit and,
therefore, it is an imperfect instrument for taxing pure economic profit. However, the two concepts do overlap. On the
revenue side, the two bases will yield about the same result for many corporations since, in most respects (other than for
capital property), economic profit for tax purposes includes accrued revenues. However, in arriving at their respective
concepts of profit the two bases require very different types of deductions. Most obviously, some of the deductions allowed
under the income tax are less generous than those allowed under a tax on pure economic profits; most notably, the income
tax does not allow a deduction for the opportunity cost of equity capital. However, in other cases the deductions permitted
under the income tax are more generous than would be allowed under a tax on pure economic profits tax. For example,
under an income tax, not only real, but nominal interest expenses are deductible and the allowance for depreciation
often exceeds the economic depreciation of capital properties. Of course, it is highly unlikely that the economic profit of
individual firms computed for income tax purposes would equal their pure economic profit. Nevertheless, in the absence
of a tax on pure economic profit the corporate income tax serves the purpose of capturing some of the economic rents
being earned in the Canadian economy.
From time to time, economists and government reports on tax reform have suggested that, to the extent that taxing
pure economic profit is one of the purposes of the corporate income tax, it would make sense to replace the corporate tax
with a properly designed pure economic profit tax. n47 The difficulty is that it would be impracticable to implement such
a tax base directly since many of the revenue and expenditure items that would have to be calculated in arriving at the tax
base depend upon unobservable amounts, such as the opportunity cost of equity capital. Nevertheless, it has been [*638]
postulated that simply taxing corporations on their cash flow would result in the tax falling on a firm's pure economic
profit in present value terms. There are various possible versions of a corporate cash--flow tax, however, the simplest one
would allow firms to expense all capital outlays fully, report purchases and sales on a cash rather than an accrual basis,
and remove all financial flows (dividends and interest received and paid) from the tax base. In theory, this tax base would
result in a relatively accurate measure of the corporation's economic profits. However, as many of the proponents of the
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corporate cash--flow tax have admitted, implementing it poses daunting administrative problems: other countries might
not recognize it for the purposes of their foreign tax credits; a provision making negative taxes refundable, which would
be required for the full benefits of the tax to be realized, would face enormous political resistance; in many industries
even larger distortions would be created between incorporated and unincorporated firms; and rules would be required to
address the strong incentives for individuals to incorporate their portfolio investments and personal service firms. As well
as these and other administrative problems with attempting to implement a cash--flow corporate tax, such a tax would be
anomalous and lead to all sorts of arbitrage opportunities as long as an income tax was levied at the individual level. A
cash--flow corporate tax is only a realistic possibility if the individual income tax were changed to a personal consumption
tax. n48 Finally, replacing the corporate income tax with a cash--flow tax would require the use of other policy instruments
to achieve the other objectives now served by the corporate income tax. Thus, imperfect as it is, the corporate income tax
is the only plausible way to levy a general tax on the economic rents earned in the Canadian economy.
C. THE CORPORATE TAX IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT THE UNLIMITED OPPORTUNITY FOR TAX
DEFERRAL IN A REALIZATION--BASED INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
A comprehensive income tax base consists of the value of an individual's consumption plus accumulation. Accumulation
in a year includes unrealized appreciation or in Henry Simons' words, "the change in the value of the store of property
rights between the beginning and the end of the period in question." n49 Yet, largely for administrative reasons (such as
the difficulty of valuing assets every year end and the hardship of requiring taxpayers to pay tax on gains that have not
been converted to cash), no country taxes individuals on the accrued value of their capital assets. Instead, the gains on
[*639] capital assets are taxed only when they are realized. Although the realization doctrine has been described as the
"Achilles' heel" of a comprehensive income tax ideal, n50 and is a source of significant complexity, for most types of
property the income tax system is able to cope reasonably well with taxing some gains only upon realization. The type
of property that poses the most obvious danger to the individual income tax base under a realization--based regime is
corporate shares. If the income earned in corporations was not taxed until individual shareholders sold their shares, the
individual income tax base could be significantly eroded. Individuals would divert as many income sources as possible
into corporations. Therefore, one of the most important and necessary purposes of the corporate tax is to prevent the
undue deferral of tax on income earned in corporations. n51 This is often referred to as the withholding function of the
corporate tax. n52
Few tax analysts would deny that the corporate tax is essential for the purpose of preventing the undue deferral of tax
in a realization--based individual income tax system. The debate over the past 40 or so years has been over whether, if this
withholding function of the corporate tax is its major purpose, the corporate tax should be refunded to shareholders when
they pay tax on their corporate--source income and, if so, how such a refund should be structured. Many of those who think
withholding is the primary purpose of the corporate tax argue that it can easily be integrated with the shareholder level
tax on corporate--source income with great benefit. Others, who support the separate--level corporate tax, point out that
withholding is only one function of the corporate tax and that, in any event, attempting to integrate it with the shareholder
level tax leads to a great deal of complexity and creates more distortions than it resolves.
There are two obvious ways of completely integrating the corporate with the shareholder level tax, turning the
corporate tax solely into a withholding tax. First, shareholders could be required to value their shares every year, paying
tax on the accrued gain. This is what would be required under a truly comprehensive income tax base. The only purpose
of the corporate tax would [*640] be to act as a withholding tax that would be credited against the tax liability of
individual shareholders. There are four obvious problems with this approach to integrating the two taxes. First, it would
require the annual valuation of shares. Particularly for those shares without an active market, annual valuation poses
almost insurmountable difficulties. Second, this approach requires a method for allocating the corporate withholding
tax to individual shareholders. This annual allocation would be a formidable task for large corporations with multiple
classes of stock and millions of shares being traded daily. Not requiring the corporation to withhold tax and instead
requiring individual shareholders to pay their own tax bills could avoid this problem, but the familiar liquidity problems
and problems of enforcement and collection remain. Third, this approach would tax shareholders not only on their
share of corporate profits, but also on other gains that would be reflected in the value of their shares including the
unrealized appreciation of corporate assets and corporate goodwill. Thus, unless all assets were taxed on a realization
basis, distortions and inequities would result. Fourth, this method of integration would not preserve the character of the
corporate--level income and deductions. For these and other reasons, no country has attempted to refund the corporate tax
using this approach. n53
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Another method of fully integrating the shareholder and corporate tax is commonly referred to as the partnership
or shareholder allocation approach. Under this approach, in its purest form, the corporation would simply be treated
as a conduit and all items of income and deductions would be allocated among the individual shareholders each year.
The tax collected at the corporate level would simply act as a withholding tax in much the same way that employers
withhold the tax to be paid by employees every year. In Canada, the Carter Commission proposed a variant of this type
of integration. n54 Again, there is a long list of administrative and other reasons why no country has considered this
proposal practicable. First, with large publicly held corporations that have often dozens of classes of different shares,
where individual shares might be traded several times a year, and [*641] where financing instruments that have been
issued may only look like shares, it is improbable that a method could be found of sensibly allocating corporate retained
earnings to individual shareholders. This problem would be compounded where there were several levels of corporate
holdings, each with different year--ends. Second, unless the corporate withholding tax was set at the top individual rate,
shareholders might face liquidity problems. Third, this form of integration would make it impossible, or at least very
difficult, to use the corporate tax as a policy instrument for providing incentives for activities to be favoured by the
government, including small businesses ---- instead of targeting one taxpayer, the corporation, by imposing lower tax rates,
for example, on a particular activity, the government would need to consider the effect of particular measures on the
ultimate payees of the tax: individual shareholders, each of whom might face slightly different tax consequences of a
particular incentive. Fourth, the revenue consequences, particularly if the tax was refunded to tax--exempt institutions and
non--resident shareholders, would be extremely large. Fifth, if the corporate calculation of income was disputed by the
revenue authorities, this method would require adjustments to be made to the tax liability of all shareholders years after
the filing of their individual tax returns. The frequent trading of equity ownership would complicate this audit difficulty,
as would the differing year--ends of the shareholders and corporation. n55 Sixth, the partnership approach might create
excessive agency costs as investors, with different tax positions, might disagree about internal corporate decisions and
may, therefore, feel the need to more closely monitor managers' decisions. n56
In recognition of these and other problems, instead of implementing a system of full integration for the corporate and
shareholder level taxes, those countries that refund part of the corporate tax have implemented only partial systems of
integration. Most significantly, they have only attempted to refund the corporate tax paid on dividends, instead of that
paid on retained earnings. Moreover, even on the payment of dividends, many refund only part of the corporate tax paid
on the retained earnings out of which the dividends are paid.
The different methods that countries have used to achieve some degree of partial integration, or that commentators
have urged countries to adopt, are legion. n57 However, most methods are some variation on one of three [*642] systems.
n58 Some partial integration systems allow corporations to deduct dividend payments, others provide a tax credit to
shareholders who pay tax on dividends, and others apply one rate of corporate level tax to retained earnings and another
to dividends. The point here is not to review the details of these schemes, but rather to note that all of them ultimately
lead to enormous complexity in the tax system and appear to create as many distortions as they purport to remove. For
example, any integration scheme poses numerous difficulties and opens up opportunities for tax avoidance. One of the
most difficult issues has been how to relate a dividend tax credit to the actual corporate tax paid on the retained earnings
out of which the dividend has been paid. Another difficulty is that the refund is seldom extended to charities and other
tax--exempt institutions or to low--income shareholders. This greatly reduces the possible positive effects of integration,
namely, the elimination of the disparate treatment between debt and equity. Yet another difficulty is that most schemes
of partial integration do not extend relief to non--resident shareholders. n59 Again, this undoes much of the supposed
benefits of integration. However, to extend it to foreign shareholders would invariably result in large revenue losses and
would be contrary to another of the principal purposes of the corporate tax, namely to tax non--residents' business income
earned in the source country.
Most importantly, without complete harmonization between countries, there is no way that the international biases
created by some form of partial integration can be removed. In theory, to have an efficient allocation of worldwide capital,
investors should pay the same tax whether they invest in their own residence country or some other country. Moreover, the
tax that investors pay in another country should be the same as that paid by resident investors in that country. However,
by way of illustrating the distorting effects of some form of partial integration, if a non--resident investor is investing
in a country that is providing dividend tax credits only to resident shareholders, investment biases will be present. n60
Even if non--resident investors receive a dividend tax credit in the foreign country, there still might be an investment
[*643] bias since that might reduce the taxes they pay on foreign investments as compared to investment in their resident
country. Reuven Avi--Yonah, a U.S. tax scholar, has argued that in general, "there seems to be no reason to assume that the

Page 9
36 U.B.C. L. Rev. 621, *643

biases created by integration from an international perspective are less important than the biases created by the classical
system from a domestic perspective." n61 Indeed, a number of countries that have recently substantially reduced the
corporate tax they refund to shareholders, such as Japan, Germany and the U.K., have done so largely because increased
international investment has exacerbated the distortions caused by systems of partial integration.
In summary, an important, indeed vital, purpose of the corporate tax is to act as a back up for the individual income
tax by preventing individuals from indefinitely deferring tax on corporate source income. n62 However, because of the
complexity and additional distortions created by integration, n63 treating the tax as a separate tax and not refunding it to
individual shareholders best achieves this withholding function of the corporate tax.
D. THE CORPORATE TAX PROVIDES A JUSTIFIABLE AND WIDELY ACCEPTED TAX ON NON--RESIDENTS
Non--residents control many Canadian corporations and foreign portfolio investors hold many shares of Canadian
corporations. n64 Consequently, a good deal of the corporate tax falls on income that will be distributed to non--residents.
For at least three reasons, the corporate tax acts as a justifiable tax on the income that non--residents earn in Canada.
n65 First, while equity arguments in support of the inter--national division of tax bases are always difficult to develop
beyond assertion, it does seem equitable that the country in which business income is earned has a claim to impose the
most substantial tax upon it. The taxpayer has derived a benefit from the provision of government services that made
the earning of the income possible. In any [*644] event, it is a well--established international tax norm that the return
to equity investment will be taxed primarily in the source country, while the return to debt instruments will be taxed
primarily in the resident country. Or as Richard Bird stated in a slightly different context, "one reason most countries tax
corporate profits is because most countries tax corporate profits." n66 Once again, it might be argued that the corporate
tax is an imperfect tax for performing this function and that this objective might be more fairly achieved by simply raising
the withholding tax imposed on dividends paid to non--residents. However, raising the withholding tax would mean that
the tax would only be collected when corporate profits were distributed. Furthermore, Canada's tax treaties would restrain
increases in the withholding tax on dividends, at least for the time being. n67
A second justification commonly given by commentators for taxing the income that non--residents earn in Canada at
the corporate level is that some percentage of that income is likely to be pure economic profit. As Peter Sorensen has
suggested, "because of local factors, multinational corporations will sometimes be able to earn above--normal returns by
investing in a particular country. The corporation tax enables the domestic government to capture some of these 'location-specific rents' without deterring investment." n68 As discussed above, to the extent that the corporate tax is imposed on
pure economic profit, it is both an equitable and a neutral tax.
Third, from a practical perspective, if non--residents are not subject to tax on their Canadian earnings, their country
of residence will likely collect tax on that income. n69 The result is that revenue will simply have been transferred from
the Canadian treasury to a foreign treasury. For example, U.S. corporations carrying on business in Canada will pay U.S.
tax on their earnings when they repatriate them to the U.S. To the extent that those [*645] earnings have been taxed in
Canada, the U.S. government normally allows that tax to be credited against these corporations' U.S. tax. Consequently,
if the Canadian corporate tax is reduced, less Canadian corporate tax is collected, and more U.S. corporate tax is raised.
This justification for the corporate tax was well understood almost 40 years ago by the Carter Commission:
A substantial proportion of the shares of Canadian corporations is held by non--residents. ...The revenues
derived from taxing the corporate source income attributable to non--residents provide a major economic
benefit to Canada. If Canada did not tax corporate income on an annual basis at a rate roughly equal to the
rate other countries impose on the foreign corporate income generated by their residents, we would simply
be transferring substantial revenue from the Canadian treasury to foreign treasuries with little reduction in
taxes to the non--resident shareholder. This would provide a substantial windfall to foreign governments at
Canada's expense... n70
E. THE CORPORATE TAX SERVES AS A GENERAL BUSINESS BENEFITS TAX
A long--standing approach to equitable taxation argues that taxpayers should be taxed in line with their demand for public
services. For many specific goods and services this principle can be implemented through the use of fees, charges, and
tolls. Where the imposition of a direct charge is impracticable, taxes can sometimes be used in lieu of a direct charge.
Thus gasoline taxes are often justified as an indirect way of charging for highway usage.
Corporation shareholders derive substantial benefits from government regulations and expenditures. Hence the
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corporate income tax is sometimes justified as a general business benefits tax. Corporate shareholders receive two types
of benefits from the state. First, the shareholders, through the legal personality they are permitted to create, are granted a
number of legal privileges: limited liability, free transferability of their interest in the corporation, ability to sue and be
sued in the name of the corporation, perpetual existence of the corporation, and easy access to capital markets. Those
who deride the corporate tax as a general benefit tax argue that granting these legal privileges to corporations and their
shareholders cannot justify the separate corporate tax since benefit taxes will only promote efficiency if the taxes imposed
equal the social cost of the benefit provided. The state incurs almost no costs in providing these benefits to corporations
and shareholders. [*646] Moreover, they point out that many non--corporate legal forms that can be used to carry on a
business enterprise, such as limited partnerships and trusts, now provide the same benefits as corporations and, therefore,
a benefit tax justified on these grounds would have to be extended to all these business forms. Finally, they note that, at
the very least, whatever the value of these legal privileges, they would appear to bear almost no relationship to the base of
the corporate tax, namely economic profit.
In spite of these objections, an argument can be made that the corporate income tax can usefully serve as a general
business benefits tax. The legal privileges that corporations are granted, such as limited liability and the ability of their
shareholders to easily terminate their investments, undoubtedly provide a significant benefit to their shareholders. There
is no reason for supposing that shareholders would not be prepared to pay a considerable amount for them. Thus taxing
these benefits should not cause investors to change their behaviour. n71 Moreover, while the actual direct costs to the
government of providing these benefits to businesses carried on in the corporate form may not be substantial, as a result of
providing, for example, limited liability, the state is often left to bear other costs that it would not bear in the absence of
granting such a legal privilege. It is true that other legal forms can sometimes be used to achieve the same legal advantages
as incorporation; however, none would appear to provide those advantages as conveniently as the corporate form. If
it were the case that non--corporate business forms received government benefits similar to traditional corporations, it
could be argued that the corporate tax should be extended to such legal relationships. It is also true that the value of
these privileges to particular shareholders would appear to bear only a loose relationship to corporate profit earned for
the benefit of those shareholders; but it is difficult to imagine a method for determining the specific value of these legal
privileges to individual shareholders. Once again, the corporate tax would appear to be an imperfect tool, but the only
available tax for this purpose.
The second type of benefit that corporations receive from the state relate to the legal, social and economic infrastructure
that enable corporations to earn their business profits. Corporations clearly benefit from the state's transportation and
communication infrastructure, the state's public safety operations, the protection of property and contract rights, and a
court system and law enforcement personnel. They also benefit from the state's school system's production of an educated
workforce and its health care system's ability to keep that workforce healthy. n72 The fact that corporations attach a
[*647] great value to these services is evidenced by the fact that numerous studies have shown that corporations attach a
high significance to these types of public services when deciding where to locate their operations. Indeed, studies have
shown that in making these decisions corporations attach more significance to the availability of these public services
than they do to corporate tax levels. n73 It is true that businesses that are not incorporated also benefit from all of
these services, but aside from a few industries such as agriculture and fishing, the amount of business conducted in
unincorporated legal forms is trivial. Also, for these types of benefits in particular, it is plausible to argue that the actual
benefits corporations and their shareholders receive from them are directly related to the profits they earn. It is hard to
imagine a specific benefit tax that would be a better proxy.
F. THE CORPORATE TAX COLLECTS A GOOD DEAL OF REVENUE IN AN ADMINISTRATIVELY EFFICIENT
AND POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE MANNER
Modern governments have to collect huge amounts of revenues to finance their operations. A tax that yields a considerable
amount of revenues, is relatively easy to administer, and is politically acceptable should not be disparaged. In 2001--02 the
Canadian federal government estimated that it raised approximately $24 billion in corporate income tax revenues. n74
The [*648] corporate tax made up 13.9 percent of total federal government revenues, making the tax the third highest
revenue raiser behind the personal income tax, which raised 48.3 percent of total revenues, and excise taxes and duties,
which raised 21.1 percent of total revenues. n75 Federal government reliance on corporate tax revenues relative to other
tax revenues has varied over time. Over the last forty years, it reached a high of 20.3 percent in 1964--65 and a low of 6.0
percent in 1992--93. n76 The amount of corporate tax collected by Canada as a percentage of gross domestic product
in 2000 was 4 percent. n77 This ratio was slightly higher than the OECD average of 3.6 percent. n78 This amount of
revenue could not be raised from other tax bases without creating major dislocations in the Canadian tax system.
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The corporate tax is relatively easy to administer. n79 Compared to the individual income tax there are fewer
taxpayers. Unlike many individuals, corporations keep detailed and accurate corporate books and records of their business
transactions and have to compile their financial statements regularly. Also, unlike many individuals, corporations with
profits will normally have the cash to pay the income tax.
Although tax policy analysts seldom include this factor in their list of reasons for judging a good tax, it goes almost
without saying that to be effective a tax base must be politically acceptable. Regardless of the strength of other rationales,
the corporate tax has strong political support. It has always [*649] had strong support among left wing political
constituencies. n80 More generally, the public seems to support the corporate tax. Rarely is reducing the corporate tax
part of any party's campaign platform and corporate taxes are usually reduced only after a party has been safely elected. In
fact, even corporate [*650] mangers generally support the separate corporate tax and oppose integration. n81 Certainly
in Canada corporate managers refused to lend any support to the Carter Commission proposal to integrate the corporate
and shareholder tax. n82 It has been hypothesized that corporate managers generally oppose integration for four reasons.
n83 First, they fear that integration will simply provide windfall gains to shareholders as the price of shares increases to
reflect the greater after--tax rate of return on dividends without significantly reducing the cost of capital to the corporation.
Second, they fear that the revenue loss due to integration would foreclose reductions in the corporate tax itself or additional
tax credits for corporate investments. n84 Third, they would prefer specific tax incentives that would provide benefits
only to their firms or industries as opposed to across--the--board tax reductions in the form of reduced shareholder taxes.
n85 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, they fear that integration of the corporation and shareholder tax will increase
pressures on them to distribute more corporate earnings. n86 Corporate managers would generally prefer to be able to
finance new investments with retained earnings as opposed to new debt [*651] or equity issues in part because financing
with retained earnings subjects their decisions to less scrutiny from shareholders.
Some have contended that the corporate tax is popular mainly because no one knows for sure who pays it. n87 This
may be so, but the fact remains that when anti--tax rhetoric is prominent, to be able to resort to a tax base that has popular
support is an undeniable advantage for a tax. n88
G. THE CORPORATE TAX IS A WELL ESTABLISHED FEATURE OF THE TAX SYSTEM AND MAJOR CHANGES
TO IT WOULD ENTAIL SUBSTANTIAL TRANSITIONAL COSTS
The argument that a particular tax should be maintained because it is in place is not normally a particularly compelling
one, although the mantra "an old tax is a good tax" is popular and has a ring of truth to it. This may be especially true for a
tax like the corporate tax that serves so many purposes, is so embedded in the economy, and has undoubtedly affected so
many market prices. The kinds of adjustments to the corporate tax system proposed by the integrationists would require
more than mere tinkering at the borders of the tax. Complete integration proposals, regardless of their form, would have
[*652] ripple effects not just to the technical structure, application, and enforcement of the corporate and shareholder
level taxes, but also to all aspects of the tax system and the economy. If the other purposes of the corporate tax were
pursued through the use of alternative policy instruments such as taxing pure economic profits, taxing non--residents, and
taxing businesses on the benefits they receive from public services, the additional complexities could far exceed those
imposed by the corporate tax. The new taxes or higher tax rates needed to replace the lost corporate tax revenue inevitably
would create new distortions and inequities.
One particularly troublesome transitional problem of removing the corporate tax, whether from retained earnings or
only dividend distributions, is that it would likely result in large windfall gains to all existing shareholders without creating
any new investment. n89 This is because much of the existing corporate tax has likely been reflected or capitalized
in the price of shares. Investors who bought shares presumably were aware that both the corporate tax and the tax on
the dividends, or capital gains on distribution or realization would reduce their after--tax rate of return on corporate
investments. They would not, therefore, be willing to pay more for the share than an amount that equalized the after--tax
rate of return they could earn on their equity investment with the after--tax rate of return they could earn on any other
investment of equal risk. The result is that the price of equity securities is undoubtedly lower than it would be in the
absence of the corporate tax. If the tax were removed, or substantially reduced, one would expect the price of all equity
shares to increase. Hence, much of the benefit of the reduction in the taxes would be simply dissipated in an unjustified
windfall to existing shareholders.
There are several responses to this windfall objection to changing the corporate tax. The difficulties generally of
moving from one tax system to another have been the subject of a large and sophisticated body of tax literature. n90
Some deny that there would be any windfall in the transition in [*653] this case. They argue, for example, that individual
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investors would have anticipated possible changes in the corporate tax system and that this uncertainty would have
prevented the corporate tax from being completely discounted in the price of shares. Others note that this type of windfall
argument could be made against any almost change in the tax laws and that in most cases the efficiency gains from reform
will outweigh the inequity of providing windfall gains to some taxpayers. Nevertheless, the large potential windfall gains
in the case of wholesale changes to the corporate tax should at least caution against changes unless the benefits to be
achieved are substantial and certain.
One final consequence of abolishing or fundamentally revising the corporate tax is that governments would be left
with one less governing instrument for pursuing their policy objectives. At present, the corporate tax is used to achieve
a wide range of specific regulatory objectives; n91 for example, small businesses pay a lower rate of tax to compensate
them for credit market biases, tax credits are available to encourage new capital investments, tax incentives abound for
the conduct of scientific research and development, and there are a host of accelerated write--offs for assets whose use the
government wishes to encourage. n92 Some commentators have argued that other regulatory instruments would be as or
more effective than the corporate tax mechanism for delivery of these subsidies in most cases. n93 Although there may
be some truth to that analysis, given that the corporate tax is in place, it may be sensible to use it to provide incentives in
some cases. The corporate tax may provide a useful mechanism for delivering incentive programs because of the [*654]
expertise of the revenue agency, n94 and in some cases it may provide a more politically acceptable mechanism for
providing an incentive than the government cutting particular corporations cheques for direct payment. n95 In any event,
if the corporate tax were abolished all the objectives now pursued through the use of corporate tax expenditures would
have to be pursued using other, possibly more complex and distortionary, policy instruments.
III. THE CASE AGAINST A CORPORATE TAX
The arguments in support of the corporate tax outlined above do not rest upon the premise that the corporate tax in its
current form is designed perfectly to meet each of its possible objectives. They do illustrate, however, that the corporate tax
serves myriad different purposes reasonably well. The corporate tax increases the fairness of the tax system, exacts some
portion of pure economic rents, prevents deferral of individual taxes, operates as an effective capital tax on non--residents,
ensures that corporations internalize some of the social costs they create and that they pay for some of the benefits they
receive from government, collects revenue in a politically acceptable fashion, and is embedded in the economy. It would
be impossible to design a series of specific taxes that would serve these goals as effectively without incurring substantial
administrative and transitional costs.
In spite of the purposes that the corporate tax serves, there are a number of familiar arguments that have been made
against its retention. Taxes are traditionally evaluated using the criteria of equity, neutrality, and simplicity. Opponents
of the corporate tax allege that it violates each of these criteria. It is inequitable because it results in the double taxation
of corporate--source income. It creates three major economic distortions: it causes firms to reduce dividend payments; it
causes firms to become too heavily leveraged; and it distorts the allocation of resources between the corporate and non-corporate sectors. It also requires a number of administratively difficult distinctions to be made between, for example,
corporate and non--corporate business forms, and debt and equity. All of the arguments against the corporate tax can be
categorized under one of these three types of criticisms. After setting out each of these criticisms, this part of the paper
argues that they are not nearly as serious as opponents of the corporate tax have suggested.
[*655] A. THE CORPORATE TAX AND THE TAX ON DIVIDENDS IMPOSE AN INEQUITABLE DOUBLE TAX
ON CORPORATE--SOURCE INCOME
The equity case against the corporate tax ---- the so--called double taxation argument ---- is easy to illustrate. Assume that
a corporation earns $100 of profits and the corporate tax rate is 35 percent. The corporation will have after--tax earnings
of ($ 100 -- $35) $65. If these after--tax corporate earnings are distributed to shareholders whose individual tax rate is 40
percent, the shareholders will pay tax of (40 percent of $65) $26 and be left with ($ 65 -- $26) $39 after--tax. Consequently,
the shareholders will have paid an effective rate of tax of 61 percent on $100 of corporate--source income, even though
their individual marginal rate is only 40 percent. This inequity arguably is compounded since the corporate tax is a flat
rate and thus imposes the same basic tax rate on low--and high--income shareholders.
This equity argument against the corporate tax is misleading for a number of reasons. First, characterizing the tax
on corporate--source income as a double tax to invoke an obvious moral objection to the tax is conceptually misleading.
n96 Most forms of income are subject to double tax and even triple or quadruple tax. Labour income, for example, is
often subject to the income tax plus two or three different payroll taxes. When income is consumed it is likely subject
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to another series of taxes in the form of excise, import and sales taxes. If one's concern were income that was subject
to more than one tax, corporate--source capital income would not be the place to start. In fact, as long as each separate
tax can be justified, there can be little objection on the grounds of equity to multiple taxation. As argued in Part II, the
corporate--level tax has a number of separate justifications. Moreover, it seems worth noting that even if two taxes do not
have separate justifications, presumably what individual taxpayers care about is not the number of taxes they pay but the
overall rate of tax. One might assume that income subject to four different taxes each with a rate of 5 percent would be
more acceptable to most taxpayers than the same income being subject to one level of tax with a rate of 40 percent.
Second, the standard example illustrating the inequity of the corporate tax is misleading because it assumes that the
statutory rate of tax on corporate--source income is also the effective rate and that corporate retained earnings are always
immediately distributed. Few, if any, corporations pay tax at the statutory rate. In fact, the Mintz Committee found that
the average federal [*656] effective tax rate for corporations operating in all industries was 16 percent. n97 Many
profitable corporations pay no income tax at all because they are able to take advantage of corporate tax incentives and
credits. Moreover, many shareholders similarly do not pay tax on dividends, either because they are tax--exempt, such as
charities and pension plans, or because they are other corporations (and able to pass intercorporate dividends tax--free).
n98 Given the high number of non--taxable corporations and investors, instead of a slogan against double taxation, in
many instances it would be more appropriate for tax reformers to be concerned about collecting at least one level of tax.
Furthermore, because of the small business credit, the system of refundable taxes for investment income earned by private
corporations, and the dividend tax credit mechanism, business income earned by Canadian--controlled private corporations
and investment income earned by private corporations is not subject to any form of double tax in the Canadian tax system.
An even more significant factor resulting in the reduction of the total amount of tax paid on corporate--source income
is that corporate profits often are not distributed to shareholders but instead are reinvested by the corporation. Individual
shareholders do not pay tax on retained earnings until they sell their shares. In this case, if the corporate tax rate is
significantly less than the rate of tax paid by the individual shareholder, the overall tax paid on corporate--source income
often will be much less than if the shareholder had earned the business income directly. n99 Providing a simple illustration
of the time value of the deferral in the corporation is complicated; however, Samuel [*657] C. Thompson Jr., a professor
at the University of Miami, has provided a relatively straightforward example based on the U.S. tax rates and the payout
history of American corporations. The Canadian rates do not deviate significantly from those used by Thompson, and
his example provides a useful illustration of the interaction of the value of deferral with other aspects of the taxation
of corporate--source income. Assume that the effective corporate tax rate is 22 percent, the marginal rate of tax for an
individual shareholder on dividends is 35 percent, and the effective capital gains rate is 15 percent. Assume also that
corporations distribute 60 percent of their after--tax earnings to shareholders ---- 60 percent of that amount as dividends,
and 40 percent as share repurchases that qualify for capital gains treatment. Finally, assume that shareholders generally
sell their shares after 10 years and that the discount rate is 10 percent. Given these assumptions, Thompson calculated that
the present value of the aggregate tax burden from the corporate tax, shareholder tax on dividends and repurchases, and
capital gains tax on disposition result in a tax rate of 35.5 percent. n100 This rate is lower than the top personal rate on
ordinary income.
Finally, the example illustrating the inequity of the corporate tax is misleading because it assumes that the incidence of
the corporate--level tax falls fully on shareholders and that no market adjustment occurs to the price of shares to account
for the tax. If the corporate tax is shifted forward to consumers in the form of higher prices or back to workers in the form
of lower wages then profits available to shareholders will be unaffected by the tax. n101 If this is the case, an argument can
be made that consumers or workers should be receiving the tax relief that shareholders argue they are entitled to because
of double tax. However, even assuming that part of the tax falls on profits and, therefore, the return that is available to
shareholders, the price of shares should adjust to completely remove any inequity potentially caused by the tax. This is the
familiar point about the capitalization of taxes discussed in the section of the paper that addressed the transition effects of
a move from the corporate tax. In the example above, purporting to illustrate the inequity of the corporate tax, taxpayers
would have paid a price for the shares that would result in them earning the same after--tax rate of return that they could
earn on any equivalent [*658] investment. That is, market adjustments would ensure that the tax levied on the corporate-earned income was completely discounted in the price of the shares. This point can be seen intuitively by thinking about
how strange it is that investors who bought equity shares instead of other investments, knowing how much tax had to be
paid on each type of investment, would then think they had standing to complain on the grounds of equity about the taxes
they paid in relation to that paid on other investments. The capitalization of corporate taxes in the price of shares is, of
course, an illustration of a more general tax policy theorem, made well known in the tax literature in a classic article by

Page 14
36 U.B.C. L. Rev. 621, *658

Boris Bittker back in 1979, namely, that often because of market forces, inefficiencies will drive out inequities. n102 This
brings the paper to the next criticism of the corporate tax, the alleged inefficiencies caused by it.
B. THE CORPORATE TAX DISTORTS CORPORATE FINANCIAL DECISIONS AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS
AND THUS THE ECONOMIC WELL BEING OF TAXPAYERS
All taxes involve a transfer of resources from individual taxpayers to the government. They impose compliance costs on
taxpayers and administrative costs on the government. These costs of taxation are unavoidable. However, all taxes also
cause taxpayers to substitute preferred but taxed activities for less preferred but less taxed activities. To the extent that
taxes cause taxpayers to substitute a preferred transaction or activity for a less preferred transaction or activity they reduce
the efficiency of the economy. Although all taxes affect behaviour to some extent, corporate taxes are alleged to have
particularly adverse affects on business decisions and, therefore, the efficiency with which resources are allocated in the
economy. These alleged effects of the corporate tax include effects on financial decisions such as the choice between debt
and equity, the decision to retain earnings or distribute them as dividends, and effects on investment decisions such as the
decision of whether to invest in the corporate or non--corporate sector. n103 This section will examine these possible
distortionary effects of the corporate tax and argue that they are not likely as serious as they are often alleged to be.
[*659] 1. THE CORPORATE TAX CREATES A BIAS IN FAVOUR OF RETENTIONS
One of the important financial decisions that corporate managers must make is whether to retain and reinvest corporate
earnings or whether to distribute them to shareholders as dividends. Conscientious corporate managers endeavour to
establish a dividend policy that will maximize shareholder wealth. One of the criticisms of the corporate tax is that it
biases management financial decisions in favour of retaining corporate earnings and, therefore, reduces shareholder
wealth. Whether the corporate tax has this effect depends upon the answer to a series of questions: whether the payment
of cash dividends can affect shareholder wealth; if it can, what dividend--payout ratio will maximize shareholder wealth;
and whether the corporate tax affects that ratio?
Over the last 50 years, the prevailing finance theory view of dividend policy has shifted. Prior to 1960, to the extent
that analysts turned their attention to dividend policy at all, they simply described it, assuming that shareholders had some
unquantifiable preference for dividends over retentions because dividends were seen to remove an element of uncertainty
about shareholders' wealth position by giving them cash in hand. Then, in their classic contribution in 1961, Miller and
Modigliani hypothesized that the value of a firm should be unaffected by its dividend policy and, therefore, a matter of
indifference to its shareholders. n104 The essence of their proof of this proposition rested upon the assumption that
shareholders could by their own actions achieve whatever dividend--payout ratio they wished for a particular firm: they
could sell shares of the firm to achieve the same results as a dividend payment, and they could purchase more issued
stock to offset the effect of a dividend payment ---- in essence, investors could manufacture a home--made payout ratio
through the purchase or sale of shares. Basically, they theorized that the firm, through its financial decisions, is unable to
do something for the shareholders that they cannot do for themselves and, therefore, given the investment decisions of
firm, the firm's payout decisions are irrelevant to the shareholders. The value of a firm is determined solely by the rate of
return it earns on its investments and is independent of how those returns are split between dividends and retentions.
The Miller and Modigliani hypothesis rested upon a number of assumptions: that investors had perfect information
about the firm's investment policy and the conduct of the corporate managers, that individuals could buy and sell shares of
the firm without cost, that dividends served no purpose other than to distribute the firm's cash, and that there were no taxes
or that the taxes that were imposed were perfectly neutral in their effect on the firm's payout ratio. Following publication
of Miller and Modigliani's article, [*660] research relating to dividend policy has consisted essentially of testing the
implications of varying these assumptions.
What is now widely referred to as the traditional view of dividend policy assumes that, contrary to Miller and
Modigliani's assumption, there are a number of reasons why shareholders might value the payment of dividends (even
though they could replicate the cash flow results by selling shares): dividends might reduce agency costs, that is, the cost
shareholders incur in monitoring management; in the absence of perfect information about the corporation's prospects,
dividends might signal the corporation's profitability, or at least reduce uncertainty about the firm's prospects; and,
dividends might assist shareholders in planning their own consumption patterns, particularly since the purchase and sale
of securities is costly. n105 This traditional view also assumes, contrary to Miller and Modigliani's assumption in their
initial article, that there are tax costs to the payment of dividends, since dividends are taxed in the shareholders' hands
upon distribution, while retained earnings do not bear the shareholder level tax until the shareholders sell their shares and
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then they are taxed at preferential capital gains rates.
Thus, so the traditional argument goes, corporate managers will only pay dividends when the non--tax benefits of
paying dividends exceed the extra tax cost. Under this view, taxes on dividends clearly affect corporate financial decisions.
They reduce dividend payouts. Moreover, they increase the cost of capital to corporations. Corporations cannot finance
new investments out of retained earnings since corporations must pay out a portion of their earnings in dividends (to
satisfy shareholder demands for dividends). The marginal source of equity funds is assumed to be new issues of stock.
Thus corporate investments must earn a rate of return that will cover both the corporate tax and the tax on dividends.
Those who take this traditional view are likely to favour some form of integration of corporation and shareholder taxes in
order to remove the bias of the separate level tax on payout ratios.
Over the past 25 years, a new view of dividend policy has developed. n106 This view, which is more consistent
with Miller and Modigliani's initial assumptions, argues that dividend payments offer no benefits to investors relative
to retained earnings. They do not perform a signalling function nor do [*661] they reduce shareholder agency costs.
Dividends, under this view, are simply the funds left over after the firm has satisfied all of its other obligations and
exhausted its investment opportunities. Thus, if firms need funds for capital investment, they will find themselves under
no compulsion to pay out dividends. They will be able to finance their new investments out of retained earnings and
need not go to the market for new funds. Furthermore, this new view holds that there is no tax disadvantage to paying
out dividends as opposed to retaining earnings. The reason for this is that earned income must be paid out as dividends
eventually (equity is "trapped" in the firm) and when it is paid out (along with all of the income it has earned from being
reinvested at the corporate level) it will bear the shareholder level tax. Thus reinvesting corporate level earnings cannot
reduce the present value of the individual tax on dividends. Furthermore, shares will be priced to discount the tax liability
that will be imposed upon the eventual distribution of earnings. The tax on dividends is assumed to have no effect on the
cost of capital to the corporation since the marginal source of equity is retained earnings. Thus a change in the tax on
dividends will have no effect on the user cost of capital and thus no impact on investment decisions or shareholder wealth.
There have been countless theoretical and empirical studies of dividend policy over the past forty years and there is
still no consensus on the effect of taxes on dividend policy or even the significance of dividend policy on firm value.
Certainly, no one claims to have a firm view of the optimal dividend payout ratio. After an exhaustive review of the
studies, McKenzie and Thompson, in a background study prepared for the Mintz Committee, concluded "the current 'state
of the art' gives a slight edge to the view that dividend taxes act to dampen both investment and dividend payouts, at least
for some firms, although the results are by no means conclusive." n107
Altogether aside from the importance of a theory of dividend policy relating to individual taxable shareholders, the
fact is that there is some likelihood that in today's security markets the marginal investor in corporate equity has a zero
rate of tax and, therefore, the rate of individual tax on dividends is completely irrelevant both for investment decisions
and the determination of equity prices. Many shareholders are tax exempt, such as charities and pension plans, including
RRSPs. One would expect these shareholders to migrate to those shares that paid significant dividends, and [*662]
taxable individual shareholders to migrate towards those shares that yielded most of their return in the form of capital
gains. Thus, the corporate tax should have no effect on the cost of capital and therefore investments and no effect on the
dividend--payout ratio. Whatever the effect the corporate tax might have on payout ratios in a world of taxable individuals,
it is clearly mitigated by the presence of so many tax--exempt shareholders, including other corporate and non--resident
shareholders. Moreover, the effect of the corporate tax would be further reduced where the corporate tax rate is much
lower than the top individual marginal tax rate, as it is now in Canada; the fact that corporations can distribute earnings at
capital gains rates by redeeming shares; and the likelihood that at least some part of the tax on dividends is capitalized
into the price of shares and, therefore, any retention bias only applies to new equity, and new equity is unlikely to pay
dividends for non--tax reasons.
Finally, if the tax system were to bias corporate financial decisions in favour of retentions, it is not clear whether or
not that bias might be efficiency enhancing since it might simply be correcting for other biases in the tax system and
in the economy more generally. One the one hand, a bias in favour of retentions could mean that corporate managers
are investing funds that could be invested more efficiently by shareholders; it could mean that corporate mangers are
provided with more opportunity for misconduct; and it could result in less funds being available for small and medium
size firms because larger firms are financing their investments out of retained earnings instead of distributing funds and
competing on the new issue equity market. On the other hand, many economists argue that for numerous reasons the rate
of savings in the Canadian economy is much below the optimal level. A tax bias in favour of corporate retentions might
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increase the amount of savings in the economy. n108 If earnings are distributed, shareholders will consume some portion
of them instead of reinvesting. n109 Finally, using retained earnings to [*663] finance new investment should reduce
the transaction costs involved in issuing new securities. n110
2. THE CORPORATE TAX CREATES A BIAS IN FAVOUR OF DEBT FINANCING
In addition to the decision of whether to retain or distribute earnings, corporate managers must decide what capital
structure of the firm will maximize shareholder value and minimize the cost of capital. The traditional approach to
the question of a firm's appropriate ratio of debt to equity assumes that there is an optimal capital structure. As a firm
becomes more leveraged, the rate of return demanded by equity holders will increase to compensate equity holders for the
increased riskiness of their investment. Firms can lower their cost of capital and maximize shareholder value by issuing
debt instruments, but only to the point where the required rate of return on the increasingly risky equity capital exactly
offsets the benefit of the cheaper debt funds.
In the same way that they challenged the traditional thinking on payout ratios, in a classic article published in 1958,
Merton Miller and Franco Modigliani, who earned the Nobel prize in economics for their early work on capital structure
theory, argued that (in the absence of taxes and other costs) there is no optimal capital structure for a firm: a firm's value
and its cost of capital remain constant no matter what its ratio of debt to equity. n111 Put another way, the overall value
of a pizza is dependent on its ingredients and is unaffected by how it is sliced; similarly, a firm's value is dependent on
its profitability and the risk of its investments and is unaffected by how its capitalization is divided between debt and
equity. In the same way that their hypothesis about the irrelevance of a firm's payout ratio rests upon an assumption that
shareholders can create their own desired payout ratio by purchasing or selling the firm's shares (shareholders can create
a home--made payout ratio), Miller and Modigliani's hypothesis about the irrelevance of a firm's capital structure rests
upon an assumption that shareholders can replicate any capital structure a firm might undertake by borrowing to purchase
shares or by buying the firm's debt (shareholders can create home--made leverage). If a firm is not making optimal use of
leverage, arbitrage opportunities develop for investors that result in changes in the firm's rate of capitalization so that it
will exactly equal the rate of capitalization of an identical firm, but with a different capital structure.
[*664] In a revision to their theorem, published in 1963, Miller and Modigliani acknowledged that their original
paper had not properly accounted for taxes. n112 Interest paid on corporate debt is deductible and thus shields some
income from taxation while dividends paid on shares do not. They revised their theorem to account for the value of the
tax savings available from deducting interest on debt.
The arbitrage process that Miller and Modigliani assume will result in the irrelevance of a firm's capital structure will
never operate perfectly. Subsequent research has explored in depth the consequences for the theorem of numerous market
imperfections. The most obvious imperfection is the risk of bankruptcy. n113 The possibility of bankruptcy imposes both
direct and indirect costs on firms and thus severely limits the extent to which firms can increase their leverage. The direct
costs of bankruptcy include the extensive legal and accounting costs of going through a bankruptcy and the fact that the
value of its assets upon liquidation are likely to be considerably less than their value to the firm as a going concern. The
indirect costs of bankruptcy include all the additional costs that a firm on the brink of bankruptcy must bear including
the cost of more expensive financing, the loss of customers and key employees, and the increased costs of completing
transactions and dealing with reluctant parties. Another cost that limits the extent of leverage is the increased agency
cost that must be incurred by security holders as the debt/equity ratio increases. For example, bondholders might incur
few costs monitoring management if the amount of debt outstanding is small relative to equity capital. However, as the
firm increases its leverage, bondholders will take a greater interest in management decisions in an attempt to ensure
that their interests are being protected. In addition to demanding higher interest rates to cover these greater monitoring
costs, bondholders may even insist that the borrowing firm sign covenants that restrict corporate decision--making. High
debt/equity ratios also impose a cost by restricting a firm's flexibility in taking advantage of new opportunities and in
dealing with temporary setbacks.
[*665] In establishing their debt/equity ratio, firms trade off the tax advantages of debt against the bankruptcy,
agency, and other costs of increased leverage. The optimal capital structure is achieved at the point at which the tax shield
advantages of debt financing are exactly offset by the costs of using more debt. In this model, corporate taxes clearly
matter and could result in a firm being more heavily leveraged than it might be in the absence of taxes.
Although the tax shield offered by the interest paid on debt would seem to suggest that the corporate tax has a
significant effect on debt/equity ratios, aside from the non--tax costs of debt, there are other reasons for doubting whether
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its effect is particularly significant. The tax shield offered by debt is subject to a good deal of uncertainty. Corporations
may suffer business losses or take advantage of tax deductions and credits that reduce or completely eliminate the interest
tax shield. More importantly, the concern over the effect of the corporate tax on debt/equity ratios ignores the personal
level tax. n114 If the corporate tax is lower than the individual tax, as it has been throughout most of the history of the
income tax, and if corporations retain part of their earnings, and if capital gains are taxed at preferential tax rates, under
a set of reasonable assumptions, the tax system ---- even with the separate corporate tax ---- can be shown to favour equity
over debt. The deferral advantage offered by the corporation for the individual shareholder, which arises because the yield
on the income retained in the corporation will initially only be taxed at the lower corporate tax rate, and the lower rate of
tax on capital gains that the individual shareholder will pay on disposition, will more than offset the tax advantage to an
individual bondholder of not paying the corporate tax on interest distributions.
There is still a good deal of uncertainly surrounding the question of what an optimal capital structure should be, even
in theory. In practice, a multiple set of somewhat indeterminate considerations confront a corporate manager who must
decide on a firm's debt/equity ratio. There is clearly no algorithm that can assist corporate managers in reaching this
decision. Therefore, it is not surprising that observed debt/equity ratios vary widely across firms, even within the same
industry, and that the market value of firms appears to be fairly insensitive to the choice of capital structures. Therefore,
also not surprisingly, the empirical studies have not generally found any link between debt/equity ratios and the corporate
income tax. n115 Most recently, Jeffrey [*666] Pittman concluded a review of the studies by noting "most empirical
capital structure studies do not find that taxes matter to firms' financing and investment policies." n116
Even if the corporate tax is found to affect debt/equity ratios, it is not obvious whether or not this bias reduces or
enhances efficiency. On the one hand, increased leverage due to taxes might be assumed to carry a number of costs
including making firms less willing to engage in risky activity and more susceptible to bankruptcy. On the other hand,
increased leverage might perform the useful function of creating incentives for management to be more efficient, since
they will have to meet the fixed interest charges each quarter.
3. THE CORPORATE TAX CREATES A BIAS IN FAVOUR OF INVESTMENTS IN THE NON--CORPORATE
SECTOR
Since the corporate tax is a tax on the return to corporate equity capital, it can be avoided simply by making equity
investments in non--corporate business enterprises. This might result in an over--investment in industries where firms
are traditionally not incorporated, such as agriculture and fishing, and could result in business being carried on in non-corporate forms even though it might be more efficiently organized in corporate form.
A number of considerations would suggest, however, that these possible distortions of the corporate tax are not likely
to be serious. First, as argued above, when the corporate tax rate is significantly lower than the top individual rate, and
business income is being reinvested, the corporate form can act as a tax shelter for individual investors. Second, in
Canada the bias in favour of the non--corporate form is removed altogether for firms that qualify for the small business
credit. The ability to reduce the corporate tax rate to below 20 percent, plus a host of other tax rules that often favour
incorporation, mean that there are substantial tax savings to be realized in incorporating small firms in every industry.
Third, for large firms, the non--tax reasons for incorporating, including the centralization of and increased control over
management, the increased access to capital markets, and the assurance of limited liability, will almost always dominate
any tax disadvantage of incorporation. n117 Fourth, the plethora of tax expenditures, in many cases that [*667] are
available only to corporations, means that the effective tax rate of corporate--source income is often quite low.
C. THE CORPORATE TAX COMPLICATES THE TAX SYSTEM BY REQUIRING ARBITRARY AND DIFFICULT
DISTINCTIONS TO BE DRAWN BY TAX ADMINISTRATORS
The corporate tax is a tax on the return to corporate equity capital. Therefore, it necessarily requires a distinction to be
drawn between corporate and other forms of equity and between corporate equity and corporate debt. The shareholder
level tax on dividends also requires distinctions to be drawn between dividends and retentions and between dividends and
the return of capital. The problem of drawing lines between these legal concepts is unquestionably difficult, consumes a
considerable amount of resources, and provides opportunities for tax arbitrage. However, the legal line drawing that needs
to be done is no more difficult than it is in many areas of law. Indeed, these precise legal distinctions have to be drawn in
several areas of law, including corporate and commercial law.
Ideally, the distinction between corporations and other legal entities used for the purpose of carrying on business
enterprises would be drawn based upon the justifications for imposing the separate corporate tax. Thus, for purposes of
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the tax, corporations should be defined, for example, as legal forms that are carrying on business activity that derive
substantial benefits from government infrastructure and services, that are likely to attract foreign investors, and that
provide opportunities to defer the payment of tax on accumulating income. This would suggest, frankly, that all legal
forms that carry on substantial business activities should be taxed as corporations. By simply relying upon the formal
legal concept of a corporation, the present Canadian tax system does not fall too far short of this ideal. However, as tax
planners become more ingenious and aggressive in attempting to avoid the corporate level tax by changing the legal form
for their business enterprise, this definition may need to be supplemented with some bright--line rules that look at the
economic substance of the taxpayer's enterprise such as the number of owners (all non--corporate entities with more than,
say, 35 owners could be taxed as corporations), n118 whether the entity had the legal characteristics of corporations, or
whether the ownership interests in the entity [*668] offered a specified degree of liquidity. n119 Even under the present
law, for the purposes of levying the Canadian corporate tax on foreign entities, the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
classifies myriad different legal forms. n120 Given the political will, the problem of determining whether a legal form is
a corporation or analogous to a corporation for the purpose of imposing a tax on it does not seem particularly onerous.
Distinguishing between debt and equity for the purposes of imposing the corporate tax is admittedly more difficult
and has given rise to considerable tax planning and administrative costs. The problem is that in a business relationship
every element and degree of the fundamental attributes of the business that are reflected in a debt or equity financing
instrument ---- such as risk of loss, the nature of the return, the allocation of control, and the duration of the relationship ---are subject to negotiation. Based upon the totality of factors present in their contracts, one type of investor is labelled an
owner and another a creditor, but there is clearly a undifferentiated continuum of financial contracts that can be created
and no normative basis for distinguishing between them in terms of tax principles.
The Canadian tax system has dealt with this problem by relying upon the legal label attached by the parties to the
financing instruments used by them and then has attempted to deal with the classification of so--called hybrid instruments
on an ad hoc basis as significant tax arbitrage opportunities arise. n121 Arguably, this approach has not fared badly.
However, once again, if the government felt that the problem was serious enough, and had the political will, it could
adopt other approaches for distinguishing between debt and equity that would go along way to solving the problem. For
example, Tim Edgar has suggested that a list of indeterminate factors could be used to classify instruments. n122 David
Weisbach has argued that a line should be drawn between debt and equity based on efficiency criteria. n123
Even though the Canadian government could likely do a better job of distinguishing between debt and equity for the
purposes of the corporation tax, [*669] the administrative problem of drawing a distinction between debt and equity is
unquestionably difficult and any solution not completely satisfactory. However, it is important to note that this problem
transcends issues of the corporate tax. On the one hand, no country has integrated its corporate and shareholder tax in
a way that makes the distinction irrelevant. The most commonly suggested method of integration that would solve this
problem is to provide a deduction for dividends at the corporate level, instead of an exclusion or credit at the shareholder
level, but this solution has its own problems. In particular, it removes any Canadian tax on tax--exempt shareholders
and non--residents. On the other hand, even if a method of integration were adopted that would make the distinction
between debt and equity irrelevant for corporate tax purposes, unless a comprehensive solution to the problem of financial
instruments were enacted at the individual level, the distinction would still be relevant for tax purposes. n124
IV. THE FUTURE OF CANADA'S SEPARATE CORPORATE TAX
In the light of this overview of the case for and against the separate corporate tax, none of the arguments for abolishing
the tax on dividends made by Canadian financial commentators in response to President Bush's dividend plan seem
convincing. The equity arguments they made ---- namely, that the double taxation of corporate--source income is anathema
to the notion of fairness and that the exclusion of dividends from income would provide a tax break for middle--income
Canadians ---- rest upon a conceptual misunderstanding of the incidence of the corporate tax and a mis--description of
the top 1 percent of Canadians. Assertions that the exemption of dividends from individual income tax would increase
shareholder value, reduce the cost of capital, and improve corporate responsibility, assume that the corporate tax affects
the financial decisions of corporate managers. Both the theory and the empirical evidence in support of such contentions
are weak. To the extent that such a tax cut did increase stock prices, it would at best have a minimal impact on investment,
which is financed mainly by borrowing or retained earnings, not issuances of new shares. Although the present Canadian
approach for distinguishing between corporate and non--corporate equity and between corporate equity and corporate debt
provides opportunities for arbitrage, this approach could be readily modified to remove these tax planning opportunities.
Moreover, reducing the tax on dividends only creates additional opportunities for tax planning.
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Canada, at present, provides a tax credit for dividend income that compensates shareholders for about 20 percentage
points of corporate tax. [*670] Instead of enriching this credit, or completely exempting dividends from tax, a strong
case can be made for repealing the existing dividend tax credit and using the increased tax revenue to reduce the corporate
tax rate. n125 The Canadian dividend tax credit is anomalous. n126 It benefits primarily high--income individuals.
n127 It is completely unrelated to corporate tax paid: shareholders receive the credit, ostensibly to compensate them for
the corporate tax paid on their dividends, even though the corporation might have paid no tax on the income. It is not
extended to tax exempt organizations such as charities and pension plans, nor is it refunded to individual taxpayers whose
tax liability is less than the credit. Non--residents do not receive the credit. n128 If the costs of finance that Canadian
firms must pay are set in international capital markets because of the openness of the Canadian economy, then providing
domestic shareholders with a dividend tax credit can do nothing to reduce the cost of capital in Canada. Domestic
shareholders will simply replace foreign shareholders in Canadian firms, with no beneficial investment incentive effects.
n129 For these reasons, it is hard to imagine that the credit [*671] operates to mitigate any of the distortions that the
corporate tax might impose. Its only useful function is to provide, in effect, for the pass--through treatment of income
earned in small businesses. This function could be better served by allowing small corporations to elect to be taxed as
partnerships.
A number of economists have argued that, regardless of the strength of the traditional arguments supporting a corporate
tax, with increased globalization, countries will be unable to sustain the tax. n130 As investment capital becomes
increasingly mobile, firms will be able to locate their assets in the most tax--advantaged jurisdictions. The corporate tax
will be a victim of the resulting race to the bottom to attract investment capital. It is also argued that the development
of e--commerce and the increasingly sophisticated use of financial instruments will make administering and enforcing
the corporate tax impossible. This is not the place to deal with these arguments, except to note that to date, despite the
predictions of the commentators, the corporate tax has remained remarkably resilient. Although the corporate tax rates in
a number of OECD countries have been reduced in recent years, the corporate tax collected relative to GDP has remained
constant or even risen. n131 Perhaps the resilience of the corporate tax can be attributed to the many functions it performs
in a modern tax system. The justifications for the tax remain as important today as they have been throughout the history
of the tax. However, what the arguments in this paper would suggest is that if the corporate tax is to be reformed, or its
role diminished, in spite of the strong case if favour of it, the [*672] most inappropriate way of doing that would be the
approach adopted in the Bush proposal, namely, by refunding it, in effect, to individual shareholders. n132
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